Cornell Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 3 March 1916

Article 2

Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits
George Gleason Bogert

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
George Gleason Bogert, Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1 Cornell L. Rev. 159 (1916)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol1/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

The- Creation of Trusts by Means of
Bank Deposits
By GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT'

If A deposit his own money in a bank, and by his direction the
deposit is entitled "A in trust for B," is a trust created? If any
further acts on the part of A are necessary to the creation of a trust,
what are such acts?
In order that a property owner may make himself a trustee of
personal property, two elements must coexist. The property holder
must have the intent to become a trustee, and he must express that
intent by appropriate acts. The difficult question in all cases
involving an inquiry as to whether a trust has been created is whether
the acts performed by the supposed settlor have been sufficient to
express clearly an intent to create a trust.
It is well established that the declarant of the trust need not
notify the cestui quo trust. Neither knowledge on the part of the
beneficiary 2 nor acceptance of the trust by him 3 is necessary to the
complete creation of the trust. It follows naturally that it is not
essential that the declarant should deliver to the beneficiary any
writing indicating the existence of the trust. Since the trustee is
required by the nature of his duties to remain in possession of the
trust property, it is obvious that it is not a requirement of the completed trust that the declarant should deliver to the beneficiary the
trust property.4 It is also established that a trust of personal property may be created without notice by the declarant to any third
person.

'Assistant
Prbfessor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law.
2
Fowler v. Gowing, 152 Fed. 8oi; Johnson v. Amberson, 14Q Ala. 342; Cahlan
v. Bank, xi Cal. App. 533; Security Co. v. Farrady, 82 Atl. (Del.) 24; Lewis v.
Curnutt, 130 Ia. 423; City of Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. x9o; City of Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 413; Janes v. Falk, 5o N. J. Eq. 468; Neilson v.
Blight, i Johns. Cas. 205; Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. 428; Williams v. Haskin's
Estate, 66 Vt. 378.
3
Brunson v. Henry, 140 Ind. 455; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321; Lewis v. Curnutt, 13o Ia. 423; Libby v. Frost, 98 Me. 288; Suydam v. Dequindre, Har. Ch.
(Mich.) 347; Stone v. King, 7 R. 1. 358; Cloud v. Calhoun, io Rich. Eq. 358;
Furman v. Fisher, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) 626.
4
Williamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282; Mize v. Bates Co. Bk., 6o Mo. App. 358;
Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134; Robb v. Wash. & Jeff. College, 185 N. Y. 485.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
With these elementary principles concerning the creation of trusts
in mind, it might naturally be assumed that the mere deposit of
money in a bank, under the circumstances mentioned in the question
previously put, would lead to the establishment of a trust. The
depositor calls himself a trustee of specific trust property, namely,
the claim against the bank. His declaration is communicated to a
third party, namely, the officer of the bank. The beneficiary is
definite and clearly identified.
But the peculiarity with respect to these so-called "savings bank
trusts" is that the courts require that the declarant shall express
his intent to create a trust more clearly and by a larger number of
acts than in the case of an ordinary trust. The deposit of money
in a bank under a trust title is considered equivocal. Men frequently
deposit money under a trust title from other motives than that of
creating a trust. The attitude of the courts toward a deposit entitled "in trust" is well stated by Mr. Justice Andrews in Beaver v.
Beaver.5 "The form of the account is the essential fact upon which
the plaintiff relies. It may be justly said that a deposit in a savings
bank by one person, of his own money to the credit of another, is
consistent with an intent on the part of the depositor, to give the
money to the other. But it does not, we think, of itself, without
more, authorize an affirmative finding that the deposit was made
with that intent, when the deposit was to a new account, unaccompanied by any declaration of intention, and the depositor received
at the time a pass-book, the possession and presentation of which,
by the rules of the bank, known to the depositor, is made the evidence
of the right to draw the deposit. We cannot close our eyes to the
well-known practice of persons depositing in savings banks money
to the credit of real or fictitious persons, with no intention of divesting themselves of ownership. It is attributable to various reasons;
reasons connected with taxation; rules of the bank limiting the
amount which any one individual may keep on deposit; the desire
to obtain high rates of interest where there is a discrimination based
on the amount of deposits, and the desire, on the part of many persons, to veil or conceal from others knowledge of their pecuniary
condition. In most cases where a deposit of this character is made
as a gift, there are contemporaneous facts or subsequent declarations
by which the intention can be established, independently of the form
of the deposit. We are inclined to think that to infer a gift from
the form of the deposit alone would, in the great majority of cases,
and especially where the deposit was of any considerable amount,
$117 N. Y. 421, 430, 431.
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impute an intention which never existed and defeat the real purpose
of the depositor."
The possibility that a depositor may be influenced by other motives
than the trust motive has caused the courts very generally to hold
that the bare deposit under a trust title does not result in the creation of a trust. The depositor must show by other acts than the
mere deposit that his object is the creation of a true trust.6
The bare deposit must be supported by other facts indicative of
trust intent. The sole problem with respect to savings bank trusts
is the weighing of the effect to be given these collateral facts. It is a
problem of evidence. Do the collateral facts, when considered with
the deposit, bring out clearly the intent to create a trust, or do they
establish that the form of the deposit is deceptive and was intended
merely to accomplish an ulterior purpose, not a trust purpose?
The evidence bearing upon the intent of the depositor, aside
from the deposit itself, may be 'divided into three classes, namely,
(a) express statements of intent; (b) acts of the depositor with respect
to the deposit or the supposed beneficiary, aside from express statements; (c) the circumstances of the depositor.
Express Statements of Intent
The most direct form of evidence as to the depositor's intent,
aside from the deposit itself, is the express statement of the depositor
concerning his intent. If the depositor stated, otherwise than by
a direction as to the title of the deposit, at the time of the deposit
that he actually intended a trust, such evidence will be admissible
and ordinarily conclusive as showing a trust.7 So, too, evidence
that the depositor stated at the time of the deposit that he intended
8
no trust is receivable as a part of the res gestae and is of great force.
Direct statements by the depositor that he intended a trust, made
after the deposit, are given much weight,9 but they are not necessarily
conclusive in showing the existence of a trust' 0 On the other hand,
6
Powers v. Prov. Inst. for Savings, 124 Mass. 377; Parkman v. Suffolk Savings
Bank, 151 Mass. 218; Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank, 182 Mass. Ixo;

Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. Ii2; Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 238; People's

Savings
Bank v. Webb, 21 R. I. 218.
7
Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 Cal. i9; Bath Savings Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122; Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, oxo
Md. 494; Martin v. Martin, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 445, appeal dismissed, 166 N. Y. 61I; Robinson v.
Appleby, 69 App. Div. (N. Y.) 5o9, aff'd, 173 N. Y. 626; contra, Clark v. Clark,
io8
Mass. 522.
8

Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321; Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571.
'Alger v. North End Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418; Peck v. Scofield, 186 Mass.
xo8; Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 2o6.
'*Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 243, aff'd, 144 N. Y. 701.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
statements by the depositor after the deposit to the effect that no
trust was intended, if the depositor is dead, are inadmissible."1 But
if the depositor is alive, he may testify as to his intent in making
the deposit, whether such testimony is favorable to a trust2 or
13

unfavorable.
A statement by the supposed beneficiary that she had no property,
made with knowledge of the deposit, 14 or a statement by the benefi-

ciary named that the deposit was made for the purpose of getting
better interest rates and not as a trust,15 is receivable as strong evidence that the depositor intended no trust.
Intent Implied from Acts of Depositor other than Express
Statements
(a) Giving notice of the deposit. If the depositor notifies the beneficiary that the deposit has been made in a trust form, a strong
presumption of a trust arises 16, 17but this presumption may be overcome by other facts in the case.
Notice of the existence of the deposit given by the depositor to
the beneficiary is not absolutely essential to the existence of a trust.' 8
In several cases notice of the existence of a deposit in trust form
given by the depositor to a third person has been given weight as
tending to show an intent to create a trust. 19 But in other instances,
notwithstanding such notice to a third person, no trust has been
found.20 The Massachusetts courts have been inclined to give very
"Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N. Y. 433; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa.
321; Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266; Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee's
Estate,
64 Vt. 571.
2

' Sayre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466.
13
Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43; In re Barefield, 177 N. Y. 387;
Savings Bank v. Webb, 21 R. I. 218.
People's
4
' In re Barefield, 177 N. Y. 387.
"6Matter
of Mueller, i5 App. Div. (N. Y.) 67.
'8Alger v. North End Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418; Peck v. Scofield, 186 Mass.
io8; Grafing v. Heilmann, 1 Apo. Div. (N. Y.) 26o, aff'd 153 N. Y. 673; Farleigh v. Cadman, i59 N. Y. 169; Decker v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 15 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 553; Meislahn v. Meislahn, 56 App. Div. (N. Y.) 566; Matter of
Pierce, 132 App. Div. (N. Y.) 465; Matter of Hewitt, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 322; Matter of Halligan, 82 Misc.-(N. Y.) 3o; Matter of Brennan, 92 Misc. (N. Y.) 423;
Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266; Petition of Atkinson, 16 R. I. 413; Connecticut
River Savings Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571.
"Nutt v. Morse, 142 Mass. I; Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288; Smith v. Speer,
34 N. J. Eq. 336; Matthews v. Brooklyn Bank, 208 N. Y. 5o8; Devlin v. Hinman,
34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1O7; Hessen v. McKinley, 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 496;
Weber v. Weber, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 255; Weber v. Weber, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 211.
18In re Podhadjsky, 137 Ia. 742; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212; Brabrook v. Boston Bank, IO4 Mass. 228; Gerrish v. New Bedford Inst., 128 Mass.
159.

I'Bath Savings Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa.
321; Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 2o6; In re Biggars, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 426; In re
King's Will, 51 Misc. (N. Y.) 375.
20Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank, 182
Mass. xo; People's Savings Bank v. Webb, 21 R. 1. 218.
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little weight to the bare deposit in trust form or to such deposit
accompanied by notice to a third person unconnected with the beneficiary. The statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank2 ' is characteristic: "An owner of property does
not lose it by using words of gift or trust concerning it in solitude or
with the knowledge of another not assuming to represent an adverse
interest. He may amuse himself as he likes."
Naturally notice of the existence of the deposit obtained without
the depositor's knowledge or consent has no effect in showing the
depositor's intent.2
(b) Transactions respecting the bank book. A trust may exist
without delivery of the bank book by the depositor to another.u
In fact, it is more natural that the trustee should retain possession
of the evidence of the trust property than that he should deliver it
to the beneficiary or to a third person.ss
But the delivery of the bank book by the depositor to the beneficiary constitutes strong evidence of intent to make a gift of the account by way of a trust.2 5 A direction by the depositor to deliver
the book to the bank for the beneficiary is also strong evidence of
26
the trust intent.
But the delivery of the book to the beneficiary is not conclusive
of a trust. The delivery may be so qualified as to show no intent
to create a trust, but merely an intent to have the beneficiary hold
the book as a bailee for the depositor.2 7 The mere fact that the
bank book is found in the possession of the beneficiary's sole heir
and next of kin does not show conclusively that a trust exists.28
When the book has been delivered by the depositor to the beneficiary, the presumption of a trust is strong, notwithstanding a redelivery to the depositor or his nominee,2 9 but in a recent case the
New York Court of Appeals has held that under some circumstances
such redelivery shows that no trust exists.30
Mass. IIo, iii.
nMatter of U. S. Trust Co., 117 App. Div. (N. Y.) 178.

2L182
22In
4

re Gaffney's Estate, 146 Pa. 49.
Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212; Weaver v. Emigrant's Ind. Savings Bank,
17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 82; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321.
25
Decker v. Union Dime Savings Institution, 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 553; Proseus
v. Porter, 2o App. Div. (N. Y.) 44; Jennings v. Hennessy, 4o App. Div. (N. Y.)
633; Matter of Davis, i I9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 35; Matter of Pierce, 132 App. Div.
(N.26 Y.) 465; Matter of Rudolph, 92 Misc. (N. Y.) 347.
Board of Missions v. Mechanics' Bank, 40 App. Div. (N. Y.) 120.
2Nutt v. Morse, x42 Mass. i; Matter of Halligan, 82 Misc. (N. Y.) 3o; Markey
v. Markey, 13 N. Y. Supp. 925.
UIn re Duffy, 127 App. Div. (N. Y.) 74"Scrivins v. North Easton Savings Bank, 166 Mass. 255; Macy v. Williams,
55 Hun (N. Y.) 489, aff'd, 125 N. Y. 767; Stockert v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 123; Ray v. Simmons, i Rz I. 266.
20
Matthews v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 2o8 N. Y. 508.
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In other cases the delivery of the book by the depositor to a third
person,3 ' or to the depositor's executor,n or the leaving of the book
with the bank," has been considered in holding that a trust was
established. But other facts may overcome the presumption of a
trust raised by the delivery of the book to a third person."
The obliteration of the words of trust from the bank book by the
3
depositor tends to show that no trust exists. 1

(c) Additions to and withdrawalsfrom account. No presumption
for or against a trust arises from the mere addition to the original
account during the life of the supposed beneficiary. The additions
become trust property or not, according to the status of the original
3
deposit."
But a deposit made after the death of the supposed beneficiary
tends to show that the trust is not
real, but rather a mere form for
3
the convenience of the depositor. 7
The use by the depositor of the interest accruing upon the deposit
for his personal benefit has -some tendency to show that no trust
was intended, and in some cases, in connection with other facts, it
has defeated a trust,38 but neither the reservation by the depositor
of the right to use the interest on the account during his life,39 nor
the actual use of such interest by the depositor,40 is necessarily inconsistent with a trust as to the principal. The crediting of the
41
interest to the trust account is an act of no significance.
The reservation by the depositor of a right to withdraw any or all
the principal fund for his own use has been viewed differently by
the several courts which have considered the question. It has been
held to militate against a trust,42 while other courts have regarded
3'Peck v. Scofield, 186 Mass. io8.
nMartin v. Martin, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 44 5 , appeal dismissed, 166 N. Y. 61 1;
Scallan v. Brooks, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 248.
3Robinson v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. (N. Y.) 509, aff'd, 173 N. Y. 626.
34Lattan v. Van Ness, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 393, aff'd, 184 N. Y. 6oi.
3'In
re Bulwinlde, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 331.
36Farleigh v. Cadman, 159 N. Y. 169; Proseus v. Porter, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.)
44; Hyde v. Kitchen, 69 Hun (N. Y.) 28o; Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266; Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571.
2In re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 331.
38Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 243, aff'd ,i44 N. Y. 701; Garvey v. Clifford, Lr4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 193; Thomas v. Newburgh Savings Bank, 73 Misc.
(N.39 Y.) 3o8, aff'd, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 937.
Gerrish v. New Beoford Inst., 128 Mass. 159.
40Gerrish v. New Bedford Inst., 128 Mass. x59; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134;
Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297; Grafing v. Heilmann, i App. Div. (N. Y.) 260,
aff'd, 153 N. Y. 673; Meislahn v. Meislahn, 56 App. Div. (N. Y.) 566; Witzel
v. Chapin, 3 Bradford Surr. (N. Y.) 386; Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266.
"Hyde v. Kitchen, 69 Hun (N. Y.) 280.
4Nutt v. Morse, 142 Mass. i; Smith v. Spear, 34 N. J. Eq. 336.
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it as not inconsistent with a trust,4 bu1t as indicating merely a power
to revoke a trust which was fully created." So, too, actual withdrawal of part or all of the principal deposit for the use of the depositor has been held in many instances to show the lack of trust
intent,45 and yet in other cases the withdrawals from the principal
46
were regarded as consistent with the trust.
Formal notice to the bank of intent to withdraw has been held
to be equivalent to actual withdrawal. 47 That the account has remained untouched as to principal and interest since the principal
deposit has been held to indicate a trust intent. 48 Withdrawal of
part of the principal by the depositor and application of it to the
use of the beneficiary tends to show a trust.49

That the account

is used by the depositor as his sole active account for the transaction
of business is strong evidence against the trust 0 An offer by the
depositor to lend the principal to a third party has been held not
inconsistent with the trust." If the trust is complete, withdrawals
from the fund for his own use will render the .trustee liable to the
beneficiary therefor, 2 but if the trust is incomplete, the withdrawals
by the depositor for his own benefit entail no responsibility."
4Carr v. Carr, i 15 Pac. (Cal.)

261;

Drinkhouse v. German Savings & Loan

Society, x18 Pac. (Cal.) 953; Culver v. Lompoc Valley Savings Bank, 134 Pac.
(Cal.) 355; Scrivens v. North Easton Savings Bank, 166 Mass. 255; Witzel Y.
Chapin, 3 Bradford Surr. (N. Y.) 386.
"Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, iOl Md. 494.
45
jewett v. Shattuck, 124 Mass. 590; Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 243,
aff'd, 144 N. Y. 701; Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112; Lattan v. Van Ness, 107
App. Div. (N. Y.) 393, aff'd, 184 N. Y. 6or; Matthews v. Brooklyn Savings
Bank, 208 N. Y. 508; Devlin v. Hinman, 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 107; Hessen v.
McKinley, 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 496; Lee v. Kennedy, 54 N. Y. Supp. 155;
In re Barbey's Estate, 114 N. Y. Supp. 725; In re Biggars, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 426;
Weber
v. Weber, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 255.
46
Milholandv. Whalen,89 Md. 212; Scott v. Harbeck, 49 N.Y. 292; Mabiev.
Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206; Macy v. Williams, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 489, aff'd, 125 N. Y. 767;
Farleigh v. Cadman ,159 N. Y. 169; Robinson v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. (N. Y.)
509, aff'd, I7 N. Y. 626; Decker v. Union Dime Savings Inst., x5 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 553; Robertson v. McCarthy, 54 App. Div., (N. Y.) IO3; Jenkins v.
Baker, 77 App. Div. (N. Y.) 5o9; Marsh v. Keogh, 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 5o3;
Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571.
0
4 Rush v. South Brooklyn Savings Institution, 65 Misc. (N. Y.) 66.
m'Harrison v. Totten, 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 178.
4'Grafing v. Heilmann, i App. Div. (N. Y.) 26o, aff'd, 153 N. Y. 673; Farleigh v.
Cadman, 159 N.Y. 169.
60Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235.
51Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297.
"Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 2o6; Macy v. Williams, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 489, aff'd,
125 N. Y. 767; Farleigh v. Cadman, i59 N. Y. 169; Robinson v. Appleby, 69
App. Div. (N. Y.) 5o9, aff'd, 173 N. Y. 626; Decker v. Union Dime Savings Inst.
1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 553; Robertson v. McCarthy, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) lo3;
Marsh v. Keogh, 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 503.
"Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun. (N. Y.) 243, aff'd, x44 N. Y. 701; Cunningham v.
Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43; Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112; Lattan v. Van Ness,
107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 395, aff'd, 184 N. Y. 6o; Matthews v. Brooklyn Savings
Bank, 208 N. Y. 508; Hessen v. McKinley, 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 496; In re
Biggars, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 426.
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(d) Failure of depositor to w'thdraw money before his death.
The depositor's failure to act, as well as his actions, are of significance
in ascertaining whether he intended a trust. Many courts have held
the failure of the depositor to withdraw the deposit before his death
to be strong evidence of his intent to create a trust.A The mere
disappearance of the depositor is not equivalent to his death for this
purpose. 5 But failure to remove the deposit before death is not
conclusive evidence of the trust intent. Other facts may overpower it and cause an adjudication that no trust exists. 56 In a few
cases it has been held that, where the only facts proved were the
deposit in trust form and the failure to remove before the death of
the depositor,
there was not sufficient evidence to show the creation
57
of a trust.

(e) Attitude of depositor to the account before and after death
of beneficiary. It is quite generally recognized that -failure to indicate the trust intent by notice, delivery of the book, or in some
other way before the death of the supposed beneficiary, is very
strong evidence that no trust was intended.58 Allowing the account
"Bath Savings Institution v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122; Littig v. Mt. Calvary
Church, ioi Md. 494; In re Gaffney's Estate, 146 Pa. 49; Merigan v. McGonigle,
205 Pa. 321; Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571;
Petition of Atkinson, I6 R. I. 413; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. I34; Willis v.
Smyth 91, N. Y. 297; Fowler v. Bowery Savings Bank, I.3 N. Y. 450; Grafing v.
Heilmann, i App. Div. (N. Y.) 26o, aff'd, 153 N. Y. 673; Williams v. Brooklyn

Savings Bank, 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 332, appeal dismissed, i65 N. Y. 676;
Martin v. Martin, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 445, appeal dismissed, 166 N. Y. 6II;
Board of Missions v. Bank, 4o App. Div. (N. Y.) 120; Harrison v. Totten, 53
App. Div. (N. Y.) 178; Scallan v. Brooks, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 248; Meislahn v.
Meislahn, 56 App. Div. (N. Y.) 566; Marsh v. Keogh, 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 503;
O'Brien v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank, iox App. Div. (N. Y.) lO8; Beakes
Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 137; Warburton Avenue Baptist
Church v. Clark, i58 App. Div. (N. Y.) 230; In re Biggars, 39 Misc. (N. Y.)
426; Matter of Hewitt, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 322; In re King's Will, 51 Misc. (N. Y)
375; Wait v. Society, 68 Misc. (N. Y.) 245; Matter of Halligan, 82 Misc. (N. Y.)
30; Weaver v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 82;
In re Barbey's Estate, 114 N. Y. Supp. 725; Witzel v. Chapin, 3 Bradford Surr.
(N. Y.) 386. See section 144 of the New York Banking Law, second paragraph:
"When any deposit shall be made by any person in trust for another, and no
other or further notice of the existence and terms of a legal and valid trust shall
have been given in writing to the bank, in the event of the death of the trustee,
the same, or any part thereof, together with the dividends or interest thereon,
may
be paid to the person for whom the deposit was made."
S5 Hemmerich v. Union Dime Savings Institution, 205 N. Y. 366.
"6Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 243, aff'd, i44 N. Y. 701; Matter of Mueller, 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 67; Rush v. South Brooklyn Savings Bank, 65 Misc.
(N.7Y.) 66; Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235.
6 Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff (U. S.) 593; Brabrook v. Boston Bank, 104 Mass.
228: Clark v. Clark, IO8 Mass. 522; Bartlett v. Remington, 59 N. H. 364.
uCunungham v. Davenport, i47 N. Y. 43; Haux v. Dry Dock Savings
Institution, 2 App. Div. (N. Y.) 165, aff'd, 154 N. Y. 736; In re Bulwinkle, 107
App. Div. (N. Y.) 331; Garvey v. Clifford, ) 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 193; Matter
of U. S. Trust Co., 117 App. Div. (N.Y.) 178; Inre Duffy, 127 App. Div. (N.Y.)
74; In re Smyth's Estate, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 331; In re Thompson's Estate, 85
Misc. (N. Y.) 291; Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235. The case of Bishop v. Seamen's
Bank, 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) i8i, is out of accord with the better authorities.
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to stand as a trust account after the death of the supposed beneficiary, 9 or adding to the account after his death 0 does not, if no act
decisively indicative of trust intent has been done before the cestui
que trust's death, indicate a trust intent. Nor does a withdrawal of
the fund after the beneficiary's death render the depositor liable to
the representative of the beneficiary, no acts irrevocably showing
trust intent having occurred before the beneficiary's death.61
But if the depositor has decisively shown his trust intent before
the beneficiary's death, as by an express statement in a formal
application to the bank1 or by the delivery of the booktothebeneficiary,6 then the death of the beneficiary has no effect on the completed trust. The retention of the maiden name of a woman beneficiary in the trust account after the marriage of the beneficiary is
not inconsistent with a trust intent."
(f) The making of a will consistent or inconsistent with a trust.
That the depositor left a will clearly inconsistent with a trust is
strong evidence that he had no trust intent, 6 but, if the trust was
completely created by acts of the depositor before his death, an
inconsistent will cannot destroy the trust 66 . That a will
is consistent
67
with a trust intent is of some force in favor of a trust.

That the depositor had expressed his desire to provide for the
beneficiary and made no provision for him in his will is evidence
favorable to a trust as to the bank account,68 but a gift in the will
to the person named as a beneficiary in the bank account is not,
under similar circumstances, inconsistent with a gift through the
savings bank trust.6 9

Intent Implied from Circumstances of the Depositor
(a) His relationshipto the beneficiary. That the beneficiary occupies a close relationship to the depositor has often been considered
"9Garvey v. Clifford, 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 193; Ranbo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235.
6OIn re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 231.

"'Cunningham v. Davenport, I49 N. Y. 43; In re Smith's Estate, 4o Misc.
(N.2Y.) 331.
1 Robinson v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. (N. Y.) 509, aff'd, 173 N. Y. 626.
93Matter of Davis, 119g App. Div. (N. Y.) 35.
"Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297.
"Thomas v. Newburgh Savings Bank, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 3o8, aff'd, 147 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 937.
"Stockert v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 158 App. Div. (N. Y.) 123; Weaver
v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 82.
7In re King's Will, 5I Misc. (N. Y.) 375.
6In re Biggars, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 426.
6&Marsh v. Keogh, 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 5o3.
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as having some evidentiary value in favor of a trust intent.70 But
other facts in the case may weigh so strongly against trust intent
that the effect of the close relationship will be overcome and no trust
will be found.7 1 That the party claiming to be a beneficiary was
not related at all to the depositor, but merely occupied the business
him, is some evidence that no trust was
relationship of lessor toward
72
intended by the depositor.
(b) The depositor's financial condition. The financial condition
of the depositor may be such that he would be very unlikely to desire
to make a gift of the moneys deposited. Thus, that the depositor
is an aged man, having no money except that deposited in the account in question,7 3 or that the depositor was not in business, but
lived from the interest of his money and had a large part of his
money in deposits entitled "in trust," 74 is strong evidence that no
trust was intended.
(c) The depositor's other bank accounts. That the depositor has
twenty-seven bank accounts entitled "in trust," that he has $8o,ooo
on deposit in banks, that all but $26,000 of it is in accounts entitled
"in trust," and that the depositor made some deposits in trust and
delivered the books to the beneficiaries, tends to show that no trust
was intended by an account entitled "in trust for B" when the bank
book was not delivered to B. 75 That the depositor had other bank
accounts entitled "in trust" for certain letters of the alphabet and
others merely "in trust" without the mention of the name of any
beneficiary, tends to show that an account in trust for a step-daughter
was intended to create legal rights in the step-daughter regarding the
money so deposited. 76 That the depositor has no other bank ac70Garrigus v. Burnett, 9 Ind. 528 (grand-daughter); Merigan v. McGonigle,
Pa. 321 (in loco daughter); Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266 (in loco daughter);
Petition of Atkinson, i6 R. I. 413 (son); Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 2o6 (stepdaughter); Farleigh v. Cadman, I59 N. Y. 169 (adopted daughter); Williams v.
Brooklyn Savings Bank, 5i App. Div. (N. Y.) 332, appeal dismissed, I65 N. Y.
676 (brother); Bishop v. Seaman's Bank, 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) x8i (husband);
Harrison v. Totten, 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 178 (grand-niece and nearest relative);
Meislahn v. Meislahn, 56 App. Div. (N. Y.) 566 (child); Jenkins v. Baker, 77
App. Div. (N. Y.) 509 (husband); Marsh v. Keogh, 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 503
(adopted child); Matter of Davis, 19 App. Div. (N. Y.) 35 (husband); Stockert
v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 123 (niece); Miller v.
Seamen's Bank, 33 Misc. (N. Y.) 7o8 (brother); In re Biggars, 39 Misc. (N. Y.)
(child).
426
7
Peoples Savings Bank v, Webb, 21 R. I. 218 (son); Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43 (brother); Haux v. Dry Docks Savings Institution, 2 App.
Div. (N. Y.) x65, aff'd, 154 N. Y. 736 (child); Devlin v. Hinman, 34 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 107 (child); In re Smith's Estate, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 331; Weber v. Weber,
58 2How. Pr. (N. Y.) 255 (daughter).
7 Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235.
nWeber v. Weber, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 255.
74
Macy v. Widiams, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 243, aff'd, I44 N. Y. 701.
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75
Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 243, aff'd, i44 N. Y. 701.
76

Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206.
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and does an active business through
count but the one in question
77
it, militates against a trust.
(d) Rules limiting the amount of savings bank deposits. It is
customary for legislatures to place a limit upon the amount which
may be deposited under a single name in a savings bank. 78 Thus,
in New York, natural persons may not deposit more than $3,000
and societies and corporations more than $5,000 in a savings bank,7 9
under one name.
That there is such a limit and that the depositor in question had
reached it in a deposit in his own name, shows a motive other than a
trust motive for entitling another deposit "in trust." Such motive
is the avoidance of the deposit limit rule. Such evidence is, therefore, relevant on the question of trust intent and may, with other
facts, show the absence of trust intent.80 But in some cases such
evidence has not been c6nsidered conclusive against a trust, although
it has been given weight. 81 "Inasmuch as the interest limit of this
bank was $3,000 it is argued from these facts that these accounts
were opened to gain interest. But the argument at best is speculation upon a possible motive. There were other savings banks open
to him. We have seen that on the same day the depositor made a
deposit in another savings bank, and this tends to refute inference
of his ignorance of the existence of other banks or of his exclusion
of them. Moreover, if he sought a scheme to gain interest, he could
have deposited $3,o0o, instead of $2,700, in this particular account
under discussion, out of the $7,482 received by him on that day.
The argtunent based upon a scheme for interest does not carry special
force in any given case; for it is available in every case where the
depositor's own funds in the same bank have reached the limit.
where the depositor has
It has not received much consideration
82
named a beneficiary of the trust".

(e) Rules giving greater interest rates on small deposits. That the
savings bank in question gave a higher rate of interest on deposits
below a certain limit, and that the depositor already had an account
in his own name equal to such limit, is of some evidentiary value
7rRambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235.

7826 and 27 Vict., Chap. 87, sec. 39: 56 and 57 Vict., Chap. 69, see. 1, 2, 3.
7
0New York Banking Law, sec. 143.
80
Brabrook v. Boston Bank, 104 Mass. 228 (no trust); Parkman v. Suffolk
Savings Bank, 151 Mass. 218 (no trust); Thomas v. Newburgh Savings Bank,
7381Misc. (N. Y.) 308 aff'd, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 937, (no trust).
Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321; Williams v. Brooklyn Savings Bank
51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 332, appeal dismissed, 165 N. Y. 676; Meislahn v. Meislahn, 56 App. Div. (N. Y.) 566.
8Williams v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 332, 336, 337,
appeal dismissed, 165 N. Y. 676.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
as tending to show a motive for the deposit in trust form other than
the trust motive,8 3 but, notwithstanding such evidence, the existence
of a trust motive may otherwise be shown. 84
(f) Rules of taxation favoring small deposits. If the laws of the
state in question tax savings bank deposits only when larger than
a certain sum, and the depositor's individual account has alrea.dy
reached that amount, those facts may be shown as some evidence
that the depositor did not intend a trust by placing the account
in a trust form, but merely intended to avoid taxation. But, notwithstanding such a motive, other facts may show a trust.8 5
Summary
The evidence which has been considered by the courts as favorable or unfavorable to a trust in cases of deposits in banks in trust
form may be classified as follows:
Evdevce Favorable to a Trust
i. Deposit in trust form.
2. Express statement by the
depositor that he intended to
create a trust.
3. Death of depositor before
withdrawal of deposit.
4. Notice of the deposit to the
beneficiary.
5. Notice of the deposit to a
third person.
6. Delivery of the bank book
to the beneficiary.
7. Delivery of the bank book
to a third person.
8. Direction to a third person
to deliver the bank book to the
bank for the beneficiary.
9. Depositor's will consistent
with a trust.
io. The beneficiary a near
relative of the depositor.
ii.

Payment of part of the

deposit to the beneficiary.

Evidence Unfavorable to a Trust
i. The

depositor's

express

statement that he did not intend to create a trust.
2. Death of the beneficiary before notice of the trust account.
3. The depositor leaves the
account untouched after the
beneficiary's death.
4. Reservation by the depositor of a right to withdraw all or
part of the account.
5. The depositor dealt with

the interest as his own property.
6. Withdrawals from the principal by the depositor for his
own use.
7. The depositor obliterates
the trust words on the bank
book.
8. The depositor has created
some trust accounts and delivered the books, but in this
case made no delivery of the
book.
9. The beneficiary has made
admissions inconsistent with a
trust.

8Weber v. Weber, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 255; Weber v. Weber, *9Daly (N. Y).
211.
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Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206.
8

5Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571.
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io. The depositor's will is inconsistent with a trust.
ii. The depositor's financial
condition is such that he would
not be likely to make a gift of
the account.
12. This account is the deposi.
tor's only bank account and an
active one.
13. The taxation laws favored
small deposits.
14. The interest rules of the
bank favored small deposits.
15. Statutory restrictions of
the amount of savings bank
deposits favored small deposits.
To consider the construction put upon all the many possible combinations of the facts named in the above outline is beyond the limits
of this article. The previous discussion of the weight given to the
various separate evidential factors will lead the student of a new
case involving one of such factors to other similar cases. The points
of similarity and dissimilarity between the new case and such other
cases can then be ascertained and the case or cases nearest alike
on the facts can be used as a guide.8 6
86
In some instances the terms adopted by the courts in their discussions of
savings bank trusts do not seem conducive to the most logical reasoning. For
instance, in Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125-126, the New York Court of
Appeals has expressed its theory of these trusts in the following words:
"A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for
another, standing alone,/does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the
depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or
declaration, such as delivery of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case
the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act
or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was
created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor."
And in the recent case of Matthews v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 208 N. Y. 5o8,
the same court speaks of a "tentative trust" and of "revocation".
It is submitted that the theory of these trusts which is to be gathered from
the cases heretofore cited makes undesirable the use of the phrases "tentative
trust" and "revocation". The bare deposit creates no trust. When the deposit
has been completed by the performance of such other acts, the transaction is
irrevocable. Until such confirmatory acts have been performed, there is no
trust at all and it is unfortunate to call the transaction a "tentative trust."
To speak of the depositor as a tentative trustee when he has done nothing but
make the deposit is like calling a man who signs a deed, but does not acknowledge
or deliver it, a tentative grantor. And to speak of revoking the trust at any time
before it has been confirmed is like discussing the revocation of a deed which has
been only partially executed. The trust cannot be revoked except on the theory
that it is complete. Until the trust has been completed by confirmatory acts, it
is no trust at all. No question of revoking it can arise. The question is whether
the settlor will complete it or not.

